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SALE AND LEASE-BACK AGREEMENTS IN A WORLD OF TITLE 
RELATIVITY 
 
Michael Gerson (Leasing) Ltd. v Wilkinson and State Securities Ltd. 
 
*Janet Ulph, Department of Law, University of Durham 
Introduction 
 
Where there is misconduct, the courts are often faced with a choice between conflicting 
proprietary claims made by those who have innocently become caught up in the rogue’s 
activities. Very rarely, there is a windfall profit and the court may have the relatively pleasant 
task of choosing who has the better claim to it;1 however, usually the rogue is insolvent and one 
party may suffer as a result.2  
 
In an insolvency, the first hurdle for a claimant will be to establish proprietary rights in relation 
to identifiable property in order to elevate himself above the position of an unsecured creditor. 
Yet there is always a danger that a claimant can be divested of these proprietary rights if another 
party can also establish proprietary rights over the same property and can successfully rely upon 
one of the exceptions to the nemo dat principle, that no-one can transfer a better title than they 
have themselves. The recent Court of Appeal decision in Michael Gerson (Leasing) Ltd. v 
Wilkinson and State Securities Ltd. 3 is a significant case, which extends the protection offered 
to a second purchaser by the ‘seller in possession’ exception and exposes finance companies to 
unanticipated risks in relation to goods which they own but which are currently subject to sale 
and leaseback agreements. 
 
Background 
 
The essential facts were that the seller, Emshelf IX Ltd. (‘Emshelf’), sold certain plant and 
machinery to Michael Gerson (Leasing) Ltd. (‘Gerson’), a finance company, under a sale and 
leaseback agreement under which Emshelf remained in physical possession of this equipment. A 
year later, Emshelf sold the very same equipment to State Securities Ltd. (‘State’), which was 
another finance company, under a second sale and leaseback agreement. When Emshelf became 
insolvent, Gerson sued State in conversion and State successfully pleaded in defence that the 
‘seller in possession’ exception, contained in section 8 of the Factors Act 1889 and section 24 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979, applied. 
 
Section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act provides: 
Where a person having sold goods continues or is in possession of the goods, or of the 
documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person ... of the goods or 
documents under any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving the 
same in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, has the same effect as if the 
person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods 
to make the same.  
 
1   Foskett v McKeown [2000] 3 All ER 97, 99 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.  
2   Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v Unity Finance Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 371, 379 per Denning L.J.  
3   [2000] 3 WLR 1645. 
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Thus the seller in possession exception may be called into play wherever goods have been 
purchased but the seller remains in possession of them and subsequently delivers them to a 
second purchaser or pledgee who can show that the goods were received  in good faith. On the 
facts, the seller, Emshelf had remained in continuing physical possession of the goods. The 
difficult issue was whether the second purchaser, State, could be said to have received them. 
State never physically received the goods and it therefore had to argue that, according to the 
provisions of the sale and leaseback agreement, there had been a notional ‘constructive’ delivery 
of the goods by Emshelf before the goods were leased back. 
 
The debate regarding constructive delivery  
 
The question of whether physical delivery of the goods into the hands of a second purchaser is 
necessary in order to satisfy the statutory provision, or whether proof of constructive delivery is 
enough, has been a controversial one.  Interestingly, in Michael Gerson, there was no battle over 
this matter in the Court of Appeal: counsel for the claimant conceded that, for the purposes of 
the appeal, constructive delivery sufficed.4  However, as the concession was so carefully 
limited, the question could be raised afresh in the future. The matter therefore deserves analy
 
The authorities on this issue have been in disarray for some time. The main difficulty lay with 
the first instance decision of Nicholson v Harper,5 in which North J. stated that there must be 
actual physical delivery of the goods after the second sale or pledge in order to satisfy the 
statutory wording of the seller in possession exception. However, there was also the case of NZ 
Securities & Finance Ltd. v Wrightcars Ltd.,6 in which an argument that constructive delivery of 
goods  had been made under a sale and leaseback agreement was rejected and it was held that 
there must be a physical delivery of the goods to the purchaser. In coming to that decision, the 
New Zealand court relied upon Nicholson v Harper and the Australian case of Bank of New 
South Wales v Palmer.7 In the latter case, Helsham J. suggested that the view which he had 
formed that the seller in possession exception required physical delivery was supported by the 
statutory word ‘receiving.’ 
 
Yet the decision in Nicholson v Harper could be described as deeply flawed. There was no 
possibility on the facts of the case of actual physical delivery because the second pledgee was 
already in possession of the goods before the pledge in his capacity as warehouseman. This fact 
was brought to North J.’s attention but the argument that there had been a constructive delivery 
to the pledgee was rejected without discussion and without any reference to past case law. There 
were a number of cases decided before Nicholson v Harper which North J. should have  
considered. In Elmore v Stone,8 for example, the claimant had sold two horses to the defendant 
but had not been paid. Although there was no written memorandum of the sale as required by 
 
4   [2000] 3 WLR 1645, 1649 E - H, per Clarke L.J. At first instance, Michael Kershaw Q.C., sitting as a judge 
of the High Court, had held that delivery can be constructive for the purposes of the Sale of Goods Act  1979, s. 
24: Michael Gerson (Leasing) Ltd. v. Michael Wilkinson and State Securities Ltd.(1998) Unrep. 6 October, 
QBD (Liverpool). 
5    [1895] 2 Ch. 415. 
6   [1976] 1 NZLR 77 (Supreme Court in Wellington). 
7   [1970] 2 NSWLR 532 (Supreme Court of New South Wales); overruled by Gamer’s Motor Centre 
(Newcastle) Proprietary Ltd. v Natwest Wholesale Australia Proprietary Ltd. (1987) 163 CLR 236. 
8  (1809) 1 Taunt 458. 
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the Statute of Frauds, the agreement would still be enforceable by the claimant if delivery to the 
buyer could be established. Mansfield C.J. held that, where the seller had agreed to look after 
the horses for the benefit of the buyer by keeping them at livery after the sale, there had been a 
constructive delivery of the horses to the buyer. He recognised that constructive delivery can 
take various forms and gave the example of where the key of a warehouse in which the goods 
are stored is delivered to the buyer.9 One might add, as another example, that a bill of lading is 
the symbol of property in goods and its delivery is treated as delivery of the goods themselves.10 
There are other cases in which physical delivery has not been insisted upon.11  However, in 
particular, there have been two persuasive modern authorities concerning another exception to 
the nemo dat rule: in both the first instance English decision of Forsythe International (UK) Ltd. 
v Silver Shipping Co Ltd. and Petroglobe International Ltd. (The Saetta)12 and the decision of 
the High Court of Australia in Gamer’s Motor Centre (Newcastle) Proprietary Ltd. v Natwest 
Wholesale Australia Proprietary Ltd.,13 it was accepted that proof of constructive delivery 
would be enough to satisfy the buyer in possession exception.  
The concession made in Michael Gerson that constructive delivery sufficed, which was 
welcomed by Clarke L.J,14  was surely correct in principle: arguably Nicholson v Harper and 
subsequent authorities15 would not have stood up to extensive scrutiny because the courts in 
those cases had not engaged in a detailed review of past case law. Furthermore, the emphasis 
placed upon the word ‘receiving’ by Helsham J. in Bank of New South Wales v Palmer16 could 
be seen as self serving. For example, the word ‘taking’ can be found in the mercantile agency 
exception and no significance is attached to it.  It is submitted that, if the defendant can prove 
constructive delivery, then he can properly be described as having received the goods. 
 
Defining constructive delivery: transfer of control  
 
It is delivery to the second purchaser or pledgee, rather than the antecedent contract, which has 
the effect of divesting the first purchaser of his proprietary rights under the seller in possession 
exception. But what exactly is needed for constructive delivery?  There is statutory guidance in 
relation to the notion of delivery itself: according to section 61 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979, unless the context suggests otherwise, ‘delivery’ is the ‘voluntary transfer of possession 
from one person to another.’ The transfer must be voluntary in the sense that a deliberate step 
 
9   Ibid, 460. See further Ward v Turner (1751) 2 Ves Sen 431, 443 per Lord Hardwicke;  Dublin City Distillery 
Ltd. v Doherty [1914] AC 823, 843 et seq., per Lord Atkinson, 852, per Lord Parker; Wrightson v McArthur and 
Hutchisons (1919) Ltd. [1921] 2 KB 807, 816-817, per Rowlatt J.; Akron Tyre Co. Pty Ltd. v Kittson (1951) 82 
CLR 477, 494 per Williams and Kitto J.J.; Official Assignee of Madras v Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. [1935] 
AC 53, 58-59 per Lord Wright. 
10   Meyerstein v Barber (1866) LR 2 CP 38, 48 per Erle C.J., 50 per Willes J.; Official Assignee of Madras v 
Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. [1935] AC 53, 59 per Lord Wright. 
11   Marvin v Wallis (1856) 6 El. & Bl. 726, 25 LJQB 369; Whitehouse v Frost (1810) 12 East 614;Ministry for 
Supply & Development v Servicemen's Co-operative Joinery Manufacturers Ltd. (1951) 82 CLR 621; Re 
Morrison (1905) 25 NZLR 532; Re Stoneham [1918-1919] All ER 1051; Thomas v The Times Book Co. Ltd. 
[1966] 2 All ER 241. 
12   [1994] 1 WLR 1334. 
13   (1987) 163 CLR 236. 
14   [2000] 3 WLR 1645, 1649 E - H, per Clarke L.J. 
15   Bank  of New South Wales v Palmer [1970] 2 NSWLR 532; NZ Securities & Finance Ltd. v Wrightcars 
Ltd. [1976] 1 NZLR 77. 
16   [1970] 2 NSWLR 532, 535 (Supreme Court of New South Wales); overruled by Gamer’s Motor Centre 
(Newcastle) Proprietary Ltd. v Natwest Wholesale Australia Proprietary Ltd. (1987) 163 CLR 236. 
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must be taken.17 When one then turns to consider possession, statutory guidance on constructive 
possession is provided by section 1(2) of the Factors Act which states that, ‘A person shall be 
deemed to be in possession of goods or of the documents of title to goods, where the goods or 
documents of title are in his actual custody or are held by any other person subject to his control 
or for him on his behalf.’ It is clear from this section that it is wrong to focus solely upon 
transfer of physical possession; the key is the transfer of control. 
 
Yet commercial arrangements can be complex and gauging the nature and extent of control 
exercised by one party may not be straightforward. One of the difficulties facing the Court of 
Appeal in determining if and when control could be said to have been transferred under a sale 
and leaseback arrangement, was that for many years the question has been obscured by the 
shadow cast by Nicholson v Harper. However, the court confirmed that there may be 
constructive delivery where there is evidence of a change in the character of possession.18 This 
would occur where there has been an attornment: for example, where the seller, although 
remaining in possession, acknowledges that he holds the goods on account of the buyer;19 or 
where a warehouseman does so,20 or indeed where the buyer already had possession but now 
acknowledges that he holds them for his own benefit.21 
 
In coming to its decision, the Court of Appeal considered Gamer’s Motor Centre (Newcastle) 
Proprietary Ltd. v Natwest Wholesale Australia Proprietary Ltd..22 The erudite leading 
judgment given by Mason C.J. in Gamer was largely taken up with justifying the principle that 
constructive delivery was sufficient. If not for the irritant of Nicholson v Harper, the High Court 
of Australia in Gamer could have simply concentrated on the crucial question of whether 
constructive delivery could be found to have taken place on the facts. An agreement had been 
made by Gamer to sell cars to a dealer subject to a reservation of title clause. The dealer took 
possession of the cars and resold them to a finance company, Natwest.  Natwest never took 
actual physical possession of the cars; instead, the dealer retained them. Nevertheless, Natwest 
was able to rely upon the buyer in possession exception. The High Court of Australia held that 
there had been constructive delivery when the dealer sent a delivery receipt to Natwest giving 
particulars of the transaction and confirming in effect that Natwest was the owner.23 A criticism 
which had been made of the decision in Gamer was that a simple delivery note would not 
ordinarily amount to acknowledgment of change of control.24 Clarke L.J. expressly dealt with 
 
17  Forsythe International (UK) Ltd. v Silver Shipping Co Ltd. and Petroglobe International Ltd. (The Saetta 
[1994] 1 WLR 1334, affirmed by Clarke L.J. in Michael Gerson.(Leasing) Ltd. v Wilkinson and State Securities 
Ltd. [2000] 3 WLR 1645. 
18   [2000] 3 WLR 1645, 1655 D-E, per Clarke L.J.; 1668H - 1669A per Pill L.J. See F. Pollock and R.S. 
Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1888)  72-73; Bowstead 
& Reynolds on Agency (Sweet & Maxwell, 16th edn., 1996, para. 8-170). 
19   Marvin v Wallis (1856) 6 El. & Bl. 726; Elmore v Stone (1809) 1 Taunt 458; Hurry v Mangles (1808) 1 
Camp 452; Whitehouse v Frost (1810) 12 East 614; Castle v Sworder (1861) 6 H & N 828; contrast, on different 
facts, Dublin City Distillery Ltd. v Doherty  [1914] AC 823; Townley v Crump (1835) 4 Ad & E 58; Carter v 
Toussaint (1822) 5 B & Ald 855. 
20   McEwan v Smith (1849) 2 H L C 309, 325 per The Lord Chancellor; Dublin City Distillery Ltd. v Doherty  
[1914] AC 823, 847 per Lord Atkinson, 852, per Lord Parker of Waddington; Official Assignee of Madras v 
Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. [1935] AC 53, 58-59 per Lord Wright. See further, Laurie and Morewood v 
Dudin & Sons [1926] 1 KB 223; Maynegrain Pty Ltd. v Compafina Bank [1982] 2 NSWLR 141.  
21   Re Morrison (1905) 25 NZLR 532. 
22   (1987) 163 CLR 236. 
23   ibid, 250 per Mason C.J. 263 per Dawson J. 
24    See K.C.T. Sutton, Sales and Consumer Law (LBC Information Services, 1995) para. 17.21. 
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this issue in Michael Gerson. He drew upon the report of the facts of Gamer at a lower appellate 
level25 and concluded that the delivery order in Gamer had in fact been more than a simple 
receipt. The delivery order expressly provided that Natwest could recover the goods without 
notice and this statement evidenced the transfer of control to Natwest. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Michael Gerson then had to consider the particular obligations imposed 
by a sale and leaseback agreement. There would have had less difficulty if the facts had been 
otherwise and there had been an ordinary sale followed by a later request from the seller to 
borrow the goods for a specified period of time. These were the facts in Marvin v Wallis,26 and 
it was held that, as the seller had acknowledged the buyer’s title and merely held the goods as a 
bailee, there had been constructive delivery of the goods to the buyer sufficient to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds.  Michael Gerson was different: there was one entire transaction. It was argued 
on behalf of the claimant that Emshelf never lost control of the goods under such an agreement: 
there was not a moment in time when State could truly be said to be the owner with a right to 
insist on actual physical delivery of the goods and with the ability to choose whether to lease the 
goods to Emshelf or not.27 This argument had considerable force because of the fact that, once 
the lease took effect, it would be Emshelf who would be treated in law as having possession of 
the goods.28 However, the court rejected the argument. In effect, the sale and leaseback 
agreement was taken as a genuine description of what the parties intended. The court considered 
the terms of the lease and reasoned that State would not have been entitled to declare that it was 
the owner of the goods or to fulfil its obligations under the lease (such as delivery to Emshelf) if 
it did not have constructive possession of the goods in law at some point. It was concluded that 
there had been a constructive delivery to State followed by a redelivery to Emshelf. Clarke L.J. 
admitted that he was influenced by commercial considerations in coming to his decision: he 
thought that sale and leaseback agreements should be brought within the scope of the seller in 
possession exception.29 
 
Implications and critique of the decision 
 
Judged purely from a sale of goods perspective, the decision in Michael Gerson can be 
welcomed.  It provides useful guidance on what amounts to constructive delivery by focussing 
upon control: sale and leaseback agreements were analysed as involving a transfer of control 
over the goods to the purchaser followed by a retransfer of control to the lessee. Pill L.J. 
suggested that there was a danger of creating fine distinctions between sale and leaseback 
agreements and other transactions otherwise.30 If one accepts that sale and leaseback agreements 
are more than artificial credit arrangements and genuinely do involve a sale of goods followed 
by a lease, then they are difficult to distinguish from situations where the seller, a moment after 
the sale, asks to borrow the goods. Indeed, in Marvin v Wallis itself, the request by the seller to 
borrow the horse followed within seconds of completion of the sale. 
 
25   [1985] 3 NSWLR 475 (Court of Appeal of New South Wales); see [2000] 3 WLR 1645, 1650 G-H per 
Clarke L.J.  
26   (1856) 6 El. & Bl. 726, 25 LJQB 369 (cited in the Court of Appeal as Marvin v. Wallace). 
27  [2000] 3 WLR 1645, 1655 F-G, 1669 B-C. 
28   See Anglo-Irish Asset Finance v D.S.G. Financial Services [1995] CLY 4491, where it was held that, in the 
context of the seller in possession exception, it was the hirers, rather than the owner, who had constructive 
possession of cars let on hire-purchase. 
29   [2000] 3 WLR 1645, 1657 A-B. Pill L.J. preferred to express no view on this point: ibid 1669 D. 
30   [2000] 3 WLR 1645, 1669D. 
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Although it was conceded that constructive delivery was sufficient for the ‘seller in possession’ 
exception, the decision in Michael Gerson can be used to add further weight to the argument 
that, in principle, constructive delivery should suffice for both the ‘seller in possession’ and 
‘buyer in possession’ exceptions. Actual physical delivery has never been required for any of the 
other exceptions to the nemo dat rule and, although each exception has its own particular 
conditions which have to be met, harmony on basic principles is desirable. Moreover, the Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Michael Gerson can be seen as in tune with the historical development 
of the seller in possession exception: Parliament was concerned to protect purchasers where, to 
all outward appearances, the seller continued to appear as owner of the goods because he still 
remained in possession of them.31 
 
The Court of Appeal’s analysis of the law creates greater harmony within the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 itself. The concept of constructive delivery and the question of relinquishing control is 
highly significant in relation to transfer of property. For example, evidence that the seller 
intended to retain control over the goods after the contract is made will suggest that property in 
specific goods was not intended to pass at the time of the contract.32 There is also a linked 
relationship between control and delivery on the one hand and the transfer of property in the 
goods by appropriation with the other party’s assent on the other: this is true not only in relation 
to the purchase of a specific quantity of goods from a larger bulk33 but also in relation to the 
purchase of generic goods which have been ascertained.34 As Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd. 35 
illustrates, there may be a constructive delivery and the property in goods may be transferred to 
a buyer even where, because the contract is one of sale and storage, the goods are never 
physically handed over and returned but simply moved to another warehouse to be stored until 
required. 
 
Yet some difficulties remain. One argument made on behalf of the claimant was that the 
defendant did not have possession within the meaning of section 1 (2) of the Factors Act 1889. 
This was rejected on the basis that constructive possession would suffice.36 It is submitted that 
this aspect of the decision is uncontroversial.37 However, somewhat surprisingly, Clarke L.J. 
 
31   Pacific Motor Auctions Pty Ltd. v Motor Credits (Hire Finance) Ltd. [1965] AC 867, 886 per Lord Pearce 
on behalf of the Privy Council. 
32  Ministry for Supply & Development v Servicemen's Co-operative Joinery Manufacturers Ltd. (1951) 82 
CLR 621, 634-635 per Latham C.J., 641 per Williams J. 
33   See Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 61 (1), as amended: 'delivery' means voluntary transfer of possession from 
one person to another; except that in relation to sections 20A and B above it includes such appropriation of 
goods to the contract as results in property in the goods being transferred to the buyer." See further, L. Gullifer, 
“Constructive Possession after the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995" [1999] LMCLQ 93, 104. 
34   Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 18 r. 5 (1) (2); Carlos Federspiel & Co SA v Charles Twigg & Co Ltd. [1957] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 240, 255 per Pearson J. 
35   [1994] 1 WLR 1181, 1200 per Judge Paul Baker Q.C. 
36   [2000] 3 WLR 1645, 1656 F-H. 
37   On constructive possession, see City Fur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v Fureenbond (Brokers) London Ltd. 
[1937] 1 All ER 799; Forsythe International (UK) Ltd. v Silver Shipping Co Ltd. and Petroglobe International 
Ltd. (The Saetta [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 268; Four Point Garage Ltd. v Carter [1985] 3 All ER 12; Beverley 
Acceptances Ltd. v Oakley [1982] RTR 417; Lowther v Harris [1927] 1 KB 393. A person will have 
constructive possession of goods as holder of a document of title: Cahn and Mayer v Pockett’s Bristol Channel 
Steam Packet Co Ltd. [1899] 1 QB 643; Lickbarrow v Mason (1794) 5 TR 683; Kum v Wah Tat Bank Ltd. 
[1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 439. See further, J. Ulph, ‘Conflicts of Title and the Obligations of the Seller’ in E. 
McKendrick, Sale of Goods (LLP, 2000) paras. 5-040, 5-060 and 5-083.   
 
 7
                                                
appeared reluctant to accept the wider argument that the Sale of Goods Act and the Factors Act 
should be read together as a code and appeared ready to accept that there might be differences of 
interpretation between them. This raises uncertainty where none existed before. A good faith 
purchaser can rely on either set of provisions which, apart from one minor detail, are the same.38 
The two statutes are frequently read together:39 in particular, even where the Sale of Goods Act 
is pleaded, a courts must use the same generous definition of a document of title which is to be 
found in the Factors Act.40 A lack of consistency between the two statutes would be completely 
undesirable in an area of law which is already highly technical. 
 
There is one outstanding issue concerning the seller in possession exception. It was established 
by the Privy Council in Pacific Motor Auctions Pty. Ltd. v Motor Credits (Hire Finance) Ltd.41 
that a seller has the power to pass a good title to the second buyer provided he remains in 
continuous physical possession of the goods regardless of the character of the possession. Will 
constructive possession by the seller suffice in these circumstances?42 It is submitted that it 
should where, for example, the seller does not have actual physical possession of the goods 
because they are stored in a warehouse.43  
 
Yet it has to be said that the decision in Michael Gerson may not receive a warm welcome from 
insolvency practitioners. One weakness was that, as there was one transaction, it was difficult to 
pinpoint exactly when the goods were delivered to State. The court acknowledged the problem 
but Clarke L.J. sidelined this difficulty by suggesting that it was unnecessary to identify a 
moment at which the goods were delivered.44 This is unsatisfactory. If a decision in relation to 
proprietary rights hangs upon whether constructive delivery has taken place or not, then the 
court should determine the exact time when such delivery occurred. Traders need to know when 
proprietary rights have been vested or divested. Timing is everything where there is an 
insolvency.45 Arguably the Court of Appeal in Michael Gerson should have gone further and 
expressly stated that constructive delivery of the goods to State took place when the agreement 
was made: for a moment in time, State could be described as the owner before the lease took 
effect and redelivery of the goods occurred. 
 
An interesting aspect of the decision relates to the use of sale and leaseback arrangements as a 
form of secured lending. These agreements have always been vulnerable to attack by creditors in 
a company’s insolvency: if it can be shown that an agreement is in substance a disguised 
 
38   Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 21(2) provides that the provisions of the Factors Act are not excluded. 
39   Cahn and Mayer v Pockett's Bristol Channel Steam Packet Co. Ltd. [1899] 1 QB 643, 652, per A.L. Smith 
L.J.; City Fur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v Fureenbond (Brokers) London Ltd. [1937] 1 All ER 799, 802 per 
Branson J.; Forsythe International (UK) Ltd. v Silver Shipping Co Ltd. and Petroglobe International Ltd. (The 
Saetta [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 268, 275 per Clarke J.  
40   Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 61(1). See further Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol. 41, para. 751 n.8. 
41   [1965] AC 867. 
42   J. Mo, ‘ “Physical Possession” versus “Constructive Delivery” in Section 28 of the Sale of Goods Act 1923 
(NSW) - “Harmonisation” of Pacific Motor Auctions and Gamer’s Case’ (1993) 16(2) UNSW Law Journal 513, 
515, 525. 
43   This issue was raised by the High Court in Gamer’s Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Limited v Natwest 
Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd. (1987) 163 CLR 236; the judges in the majority were content to give ‘delivery’ a 
different meaning from possession if this was necessary: ibid Mason C.J. at 248 - 249; 254 per Brennan J., 260 
per Dawson J.  
44   [2000] 3 WLR 1645, 1655 H. 
45   See, for example, Neste Oy v Lloyd’s Bank plc [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658. 
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mortgage to secure a loan then it is unenforceable unless it has been registered.46 It is a question 
of looking at the parties’ intentions and the contractual terms to decide whether the sale was 
genuine or not.47 This line of attack would have been unattractive to the claimant given that its 
own right to possession rested on the validity of its sale and leaseback agreement. In any event, 
the courts have tended to take a generous approach in upholding these agreements. However, the 
decision in Michael Gerson provides a cautionary reminder to finance companies that the 
flexibility which makes these agreements so appealing may be bought at the expense of safety 
regarding their security. The defendant succeeded in divesting the claimant of its proprietary 
rights by using an exception to the nemo dat rule. Yet the effect of the decision is that the 
defendant’s proprietary rights could just as easily have been divested in turn if a third sale and 
leaseback agreement had been made. Owners operate in a world of title relativity:48 there is 
always a risk that another person may come forward with a better right to possession.  
 
A sale and leaseback agreement is a useful method by which an ailing trader can obtain a quick 
injection of capital to keep a business going. Will the decision in Michael Gerson affect its 
popularity? Ordinarily, it would not be feasible for finance companies to take physical 
possession of goods before leasing them back in order to avoid the situation where the lessee 
remains as a ‘seller in possession.’ It is more likely that finance companies will continue to 
make use of sale and leaseback agreements but will factor in this additional risk by offering to 
purchase at a lower valuation. Ironically, therefore, the court’s decision to take a generous and 
pragmatic attitude to sale and leaseback arrangements, enabling innocent finance companies to 
take advantage of the ‘seller in possession’ exception, may tend to discourage their use. Yet the 
real problem lies in a more general malaise in the law of credit and security: years ago, in 
Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd v. Twitchings,49 Lord Wilberforce bewailed the lack of a proper 
registration system of movables 50 to protect innocent purchasers and pointed out that the 
absence of such a system provided a fertile ground for fraud. Law reform in this area is now 
overdue. 
 
46   Companies Act 1985, s. 395. Written agreements made by individuals may require registration as a bill of 
sale under the Bills of Sale Acts 1878-1891. See R.M. Goode, Commercial Law (Penguin Books, 2nd edn., 
1995) 652-653. 
47   Re Curtain Dream plc [1990] BCLC 925, 935 per Knox J.; Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance 
Co Ltd. [199] BCLC 148, 154 per Dillon L.J., 186-187 per Staughton L.J. This was one of the main issues at 
first instance: the defence was that the claimant did not have a proprietary interest because its sale and leaseback 
agreement was merely a loan secured by a charge. This argument was rejected: Michael Gerson (Leasing) Ltd. 
v. Michael Wilkinson and State Securities Ltd. (1998) Unrep. 6 October, Q.B.D. (Liverpool). 
48   M.G. Bridge, ‘The Title Obligations of the Seller of Goods’ in N. Palmer and E. McKendrick, Interests in 
Goods (LLP, 2nd edn, 1998) 303 -304. 
49   [1977] AC 890, 901. 
50   See, in particular, the Crowther Committee’s Report of the Committee of Consumer Credit, Cm 4596 
(1971).  
